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Among Luther scholars this tract has ordinarily received
^ high marks. Thus Thomas M. Lindsay has noted: “Nothing
I
that Luther has written more clearly manifests that combina-
i
tion of revolutionary daring and wise conservatism which was
I
characteristic of the man.’’^ Dietrich von Oppen acknowledges
its wide influence:
The Freedom of a Christian belongs to Luther’s early work which
had decisive influence on the whole Protestant movement, before it
split into Lutheranism, Calvinism and the other particular groups.
As such it is one of the great documents of world history, a work
which opened doors to the future, first in Luther’s time and still in
our own.^
Martin Brecht speaks of the tract as “one of Luther’s most
famous writings”. 3 And re-stating Wilhelm Maurer, Eberhard
Jiingel proclaims the tract to be “the most perfect expres-
sion” of Luther’s “Reformation understanding of the mystery
of Christ” .4
Even Luther’s preecumenical opponents were not totally
negative. Hartmann Grisar, S.J., first quoted Th. Kolde, a
Protestant, who described the tract as “perhaps the most beau-
tiful publication that Luther has ever written, more the result
of religious contemplation than theological reflection.” But
Grisar also added: “It often indeed offers its false ideas under
the cloak of a mysterious manner of speech which appeals to
the heart.” ^ A generation later, Joseph Lortz was more mel-
low, although still critical: “Among Luther’s writings there is
hardly any other which makes a Catholic more melancholy
—
because it can be seen very clearly what the totally unusual
Christian strength of Luther could have accomplished for the
reform of the church in the churchy^
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The Freedom of a Christian may be seen as a conclusion of
Luther’s resounding reformation statements from 1520. Trea-
tise on Good Works (Von den guten Werken) was published
in early June 1520. To the Christian Nobility of the Ger-
man Nation^ {An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation) was
printed in August 1520, and followed by The Babylonian Cap-
tivity of the Church^ {De Captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae prae-
ludium)^ published in October 1520. Earlier research of Wil-
helm Maurer^O had established that the German version of The
Freedom of a Christian^^ ( Von der Freiheit eines Christenmen-
schen) had been written first, then revised and translated by
Luther himself into Latin {Tractatus de libertate Christiana).
In a most careful study Birgit Stolt has argued for the priority
of the Latin text.^2
I
While in celebrating conscience and courage Luther may
have contributed to the rise of the definition of freedom as af-
firmed in the Age of Enlightenment, his definition of liberty was
distinctively religious, the effect of sola gratia. This was not,
as Gerhard Ebeling reminds us, a secular concern with freedom
as “a declaration of the independence of man who does what
he pleases.” Indeed, notes Erwin Mulhaupt, “What Luther
meant by freedom and what he understood freedom to be is of
little interest for most of our contemporaries.” 1^ Otto Hermann
Pesch evaluates the situation as follows:
Of course, contemporary Christians believe they know Luther as a
hero of freedom: didn’t he successfully fight to set the Christians
free from the “tyranny” of ecclesiastical hierarchy? Didn’t he strug-
gle for the freedom of conscience from the tutelage by the priests?
Hasn’t he dissolved the illegitimate marriage of church and state,
church and worldly power, church and society? Hasn’t he liberated
the Christian theology from philosophical alienation and precisely
thereby, vice versa, freed philosophical reason from the illicit control
of theological guidance, particularly in the area of social and polit-
ical life, the field of professions, economy, and law? Isn’t Luther,
in the final analysis, the father of the Enlightenment, of the sec-
ular state, of human rights? Isn’t he after all, the spiritual and
theological grandfather of the United States with their guarantee
of religious toleration both by the government and even by church
leaders?
Otto Hermann Pesch came to criticize such marginal views
of Luther as they present an “almost entirely false” image of
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Luther, precisely because Pesch had discovered Luther’s reli-
gious centre. Namely, Luther’s “freedom by faith” is not a
mere human accomplishment, but describes saved existence
coram Deo.^^ In this presence there is both judgment and re-
demption as the believer discovers what it means to be a simul
iustus et peccator.
II
The Freedom of a Christian is prefaced by “An Open Letter
to Pope Leo X”. It is a complex statement with many nuances.
While on the whole Luther writes quite politely, even humbly,
he does distance himself from traditional Catholicism. Insofar
as that was his own religious past, the account taking had to be
painful. In any case, there is an uneasy mix of stiff politeness,
biting irony and blunt rejection. Luther scholarship has noted
these several aspects. Thus Roland H. Bainton^'^ has observed
that the letter is “deferential”, and “couched in conciliatory
terms” as noted by V.H.H. Green. Heinrich Bohmer is correct
that Luther “no longer deals with pope as a superior, but as
a Christian brother who is in a very difficult situation.” Did
Luther really expect the pope to accept this obviously new
relationship? Roland H. Bainton has mused:
If Luther supposed that this letter and tract would molhfy the pope,
he was exceedingly naive. The deferential letter itself denied the pri-
macy of the pope over councils, and the treatise asserted the priest-
hood of all believers. The pretense that the attack was directed, not
against the pope, but against the curia is the de\dce commonly em-
ployed by constitutionally-minded revolutionaries who do not like
to admit to themselves that they are rebelling against the head of a
government. The English Puritans similarly for some time claimed
that they were not fighting Charles I but only the ‘‘Malignants” by
whom he was surrounded. As conflicts continue, such fictions soon
become too transparent to be useful. Luther was early driven to
abandon the distinction, for the bull had been issued in the name
of the pope and had never been disclaimed from the Vatican. It
demanded recantation. That Luther would never accord.
If one is to search for Luther’s deeper motivation—which
Luther himself does not spell out—the interpreter’s hermeneu-
tical presuppositions will be decisive but need not necessarily
be misleading. Hartmann Grisar, S.J. quickly noticed that
the letter to Pope Leo X was pre-dated to September 6, 1520,
and written after the publication of the bull Exsurge Domine
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on September 21, 1520. Grisar suspected that Luther had
sought to avoid the perception that he was writing under the
pressure of condemnation and therefore seeking personal ad-
vantage. At the same time, the vigorous denunciation of the
Catholic Church, if perceived to be objective, would automati-
cally lessen the public force of the ban. And the high personal
praise of Leo X would either""establish the pope’s lack of grati-
tude (since he is condemning a person who has spoken so well
of him) or would place the blame on the curia from acting apart
from the pope, indeed against a friend of the pope. Finally,
the critique of Johannes Eck and Luther’s claim to be a stal-
wart defender of God’s Word would further enhance Luther’s
standing. 21
E.G. Schwiebert22 interpreted the situation in terms of the
advice which was being offered to Luther, and Luther’s own
half-hearted acceptance of such advice. Namely, Carl von
Miltitz, a young German nobleman who sought to enhance
his career through the mediating efforts between Rome and
Luther, had heard that Johannes Eck was returning to Ger-
many with a papal bull, threatening Luther’s excommunica-
tion. During the meeting of the Augustinian order at Eisleben,
August 28, 1520, Miltitz persuaded Johannes von Staupitz, the
retiring Vicar General of the German Congregation of the Au-
gustinians, and his successor Wenceslaus Link, to visit Luther.
Their meeting took place on September 6, 1520.23 Luther ex-
pressed his doubts whether a conciliatory letter would be use-
ful, yet agreed to accept the advice and to write the letter.
Further pressure on Luther came in a meeting with Miltitz
on October 1, 1520. Luther again promised to write to the
pope. 24 The result was hardly conciliatory. Richard Marius is
probably correct: “Luther’s partisans have always wanted to
see this letter as conciliatory, evidence of the graciousness of
their hero and his willingness to compromise, and they have
used it to make the Pope seem obstinate and wicked. It was
the effect Luther probably intended. In fact his letter is about
as conciliatory as a knife in the ribs.” 25 Even if this might be
an overstatement, the fact remains that at least on four points
Luther spoke to the pope as was not appropriate according to
the ordinary understanding of the 16th century ecclesial deco-
rum.
1. Luther expresses his compassion for the pope who must
live “among monsters of this age”, 26 and “sit as a lamb in the
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midst of wolves”. 27 The implication seems to be that these
evils have not only surrounded but also have overwhelmed the
pope. Therefore Luther commiserates: “I have always been
sorry. ..that you were made pope in these times.” 28
2. The praise which Luther offers to the pope is distinctively
qualified. Luther notes that he joins in this act since “all people
praise” the pope. 29 The next comment qualifies and thereby
limits: “I have never thought ill of you personally.” ^9 As Luther
had repeatedly made clear, this was not the issue which was
at stake: not the person, but the office was to be considered!
3. That Luther is in an attacking mode is clearly indicated
by Luther’s sharp advice to the pope: “Do not listen to those
sirens who pretend that you are no mere man but a demigod
so that you may command and require whatever you wish.”^l
It is here that Luther recalls the pope’s ancient title “servant
of servants”.32 Immediately Luther thunders forth: “Be not
deceived by those who pretend that you are lord of the world,
allow no one to be considered a Christian unless he accepts your
authority, and prate that you have power over heaven, hell, and
purgatory.” 33 Here the outrageous title “vicar of Christ” is of
no help: “A man is a vicar only when his superior is absent.” 34
Hence Luther’s conclusion and criticism: if the pope desires
to insist on being a vicar, he necessarily denies the present
Lordship of Christ; however, if the Lordship of Christ in the
church is affirmed, then there is no need for a vicar! And in
the latter case, Luther thinks that it is appropriate to ask:
“Indeed, what is such a vicar but an antichrist and an idol?” 35
4. Finally, as if the previous statements had not been suf-
ficiently critical of the pope, Luther assails the office of the
pope in an even more outspoken way. Luther clearly does
not any longer view the papacy as authoritative, since he has
appealed “to a future council, despite the decrees of your pre-
decessors Pius and Julius, who with a foolish tyranny forbade
such an appeal.” 36 Also, Luther admits that he has “sharply
attacked ungodly doctrines”, 37 and criticized his papal oppo-
nents “not because of their bad morals, but because of their
ungodliness.” 38 As Luther explains it, the key point at issue
is not his own inflexibility, but the ultimate and unchangeable
authority of the Bible: “In all other matters I will yield to any
man whatsoever; but I have neither the power nor will to deny
the Word of God.” 39 Luther’s verdict is scathing:
98 Consensus
As you well know, there has been flowing from Rome these many
years—like a flood covering the world—nothing but a devastation
of men’s bodies and souls and possessions, the worst examples of
the worst of all things. All this is clearer than day to all, and
the Roman church, once the holiest of all, has become the most
licentious den of thieves [Matthew 21:13], the most shameless of all
brothels, the kingdom of sin, death, and hell. It is so bad that even
Antichrist himself, if he should come, could think of nothing to add
to its wickedness."*^
Admittedly, Luther immediately offers a distinction: pope
Leo X is not included in this account! Yet since Luther does not
spell out how to separate the pope from the curia, it remains
a distinction without a real difference. In the meantime, the
curia is being assailed head on: “The Roman Curia is already
lost, for God’s wrath has relentlessly fallen upon it.” 41 And
after a short comparison between the curia and the ancient
Babylon, Luther offers one more violent and total denunciation:
Is it not true that under the vast expanse of heaven there is noth-
ing more corrupt, more pestilent, more offensive than the Roman
Curia? It surpasses beyond all comparison the godlessness of the
Turks so that, indeed, although it was once a gate of heaven, it is
now an open mouth of hell, such a mouth that it cannot be shut
because of the wrath of God.42
In a more recent reflection on Luther’s letter to pope Leo X,
Scott H. Hendrix once more sums up the situation and returns
to the crucial question: “From the letter itself there is little
reason to assume that Luther truly expected Leo to change his
mind. Why, then, did he write the letter?” Wisely, Hendrix
does not concentrate on the internal reasons of Luther’s mind,
but turns his attention to the external factors. First, Hendrix
interprets the pre-dating of the letter to Leo X as a consider-
ate political move, potentially useful to both Luther and the
electoral court at Wittenberg in order “to claim that they had
done all they could for the sake of peace.” The papal bull
Exsurge Domine had been completed on 15 June and reached
Luther on 10 October. Luther pre-dated his letter to Leo X
as of 6 September. It was printed together with the tract on
freedom before 4 November 1520. Second, Hendrix points to
Eck’s bitter attack on Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobil-
ity with the charge that Luther had misrepresented pope Leo
X as an impious man: “The charge of Eck in all likelihood
spurred Luther to construct his letter on the distinction be-
tween the person of Leo and the papal office” 43—and to defend
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the former. Third, regardless of political considerations, notes
Hendrix, “the uncompromising tone of the letter is genuine” .44
As such, it places The Freedom of a Christian into a distinctive
framework.
Some scholars, however, in commenting on The Freedom of
a Christian^ isolate it from Luther’s introductory letter. 45 Then
Luther’s tract appears pleasantly, albeit inaccurately, concilia-
tory, e.g., “Here he expressed with uncongenial moderation his
basic doctrine—that faith alone, not good works, makes the
true Christian and saves him from hell.” 45 Although contem-
porary theological goals can be ecumenical and even celebrate
convergence, a de-clawed Luther is a misunderstood Luther.
Only when it is understood what Luther actually taught, it is
possible to discuss his authentic relevance for today.
Ill
What Luther wrote was no sudden and superficial emo-
tional response. He had anticipated the events and prepared
his theological response. The ideas contained in The Freedom
of a Christian he had carefully worked out during his second
series of lectures on the Psalms, the Operationes in Psalmos^
1 to 21(22), begun in 1518. In March 1520 Luther paid special
attention to Psalm 13 (14): 1.47 Now in the tract on freedom
Luther undertook to integrate these ideas into devotional life.4S
Hence the sharp contrast: Luther’s opponents indeed have an-
alyzed faith, but have “never tasted the great strength there
is in faith”. Here the contemporary setting, and hence ex-
perience, was of great relevance. Luther is convinced that in
order to understand this “strength” of faith,49 it is necessary at
some time to have “experienced the courage which faith gives
a man when trials oppress him.” ^5 Qn the basis of this empow-
erment Luther now identifies the new condition of the believer
which he designates with a variety of biblical synonyms, such
as “Spirit”, “spiritual nature”, “soul”, and the “inner or new
man”. George W. Forell clarifies the meaning of these terms
through a contrast:
At first glance this may appear to be the same kind of argument that
allowed Plato’s Socrates to speak of the body as the prison of the
soul and to think of human liberation as liberation from the world
of shadows, the material world, into the world of ideas, the spiritual
world. . .But nothing could be further from Luther’s intention. . .The
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difference is not “matter” and “spirit” in the customary philosophi-
cal and religious sense but the person without Christ and the person
with Christ. ^1
It is in such a perspective that Luther offers the famous
paradox of freedom: “A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all,
subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of
all, subject to all.” The source for this insight, as Luther im-
mediately acknowledges, is Apostle Paul, I Corinthians 9:19,
Romans 13:8, Galatians 4:4 and Philippians 2:6-7. Indeed,
as Wolfhart Pannenberg has observed, liberty is not a mere
marginal affirmation for Luther. Pannenberg is in fact con-
vinced that even today “the language of freedom and liberty”
is a superior way to articulate the meaning of justification!
Eberhard Jiingel notes the particular flavour of the Pauline-
Lutheran approach. Here Aristotle may serve as a helpful con-
trast. He wrote: “If there is a lord, then there is (also) a
servant. And if there is a servant, then there is also a lord.”^^
In a Christian perspective, which Luther represents, the very
same person is both lord and servant. And “This is a concept
of a free lord which radically alters the notion of lordship.”
Oswald Bayer offers a further clarification: “For Luther the
servanthood of love is exclusively the servanthood of the lover,
but not of the loved one to whom freedom is granted through
such a servanthood.”^^ Here the possibility to proffer love in
authentic freedom which liberates as it redeems does not orig-
inate with mere human good-will, but only from God’s grace.
In other words, Luther continues to use the terms of “spirit”
and “flesh” in a soteriological rather than an anthropological
perspective. Wilhelm Maurer explains the approach as follows:
“The spiritual inward man [Mensch] is the new man, the man
with Christ; and the bodily, the outward man is the old man,
the man without Christ.” And while these two modes of ex-
istence can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. As
Luther puts it: “these two men in the same man contradict
each other.” Such an appeal to the simul iustus et pecca-
tor conceptuality serves to underscore that the initiative to
redemption and freedom cannot come from “the flesh”, the
sinful and unredeemed self. The illustration which Luther im-
mediately provides makes clear that the church as an insti-
tution does not offer a holy domain, somehow exempt from
the grace-sin dialectic. Luther writes: “It does not help the
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soul if the body is adorned with the sacred robes of priests
or dwells in sacred places or is occupied with sacred duties or
prays, fasts, abstains from certain kinds of food, or does any
work that can be done by the body and in the body.”^^ Ger-
hard Ebeling notes that what Luther is basically offering is
not an analysis of individual sins, but the identification of the
sinner. Yet the focus on the sinner does not exclude a concern
with grace: the soul can never be in a situation which would
be so unholy as to be beyond the reach of God’s grace. Con-
cretely this takes place through the presence of God’s Word,
and “where the Word of God is missing, there is no help at
all for the soul.”^l At the same time, insists Luther, “If it
has the Word of God it is rich and lacks nothing since it has
the World of life, truth, light, peace, righteousness, salvation,
joy, liberty, wisdom, power, grace, glory, and of every incal-
culable blessing.” Tuomo Mannermaa appeals to this text as
one of the occasions where Luther spells out the new relation-
ship between God and the believer: “The Word of the Gospel
joins God with the sinful man.” Here, while generally point-
ing to the Bible, Luther refers specifically to its very centre,
namely to Jesus Christ as the Redeemer. With precision and
power, Luther sums up: “The Word is the gospel of God con-
cerning his Son, who was made flesh, suffered, rose from the
dead, and was glorified through the Spirit who sanctifies.”
Of course, this gospel does not reach people effortlessly and
automatically. Preaching is required. And, Luther subsumes,
authentic preaching takes place in the very context of faith.
In this way Luther is not pointing either to mere word events
or to subjective devotion in Hstening, but to the dynamic of
faith which sustains both the preacher and the hstener. Hence
Luther can say: “Faith alone is the saving and efficacious use
of the Word of God....” other words, Luther is pointing
to the creative circle of faith: it is by faith that the Word is
truly heard and it is by the Word that faith is awakened.
The situation is as profound as it is complex. And, accord-
ing to Wolfhart Pannenberg, here we may see that “Luther’s
new concept of faith was in fact his most important and im-
perishable contribution to theology.” Luther’s own emphatic
concern is explicit: “Therefore it is clear that, as the soul needs
only the Word of God for its life and righteousness, so it is jus-
tified by faith alone and not any works.... Faith, then, is
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an eye-opener to the truth. Only in faith is it possible to rec-
ognize one’s own sinfulness: “the moment you begin to have
faith you learn that all things in you are altogether blame-
worthy, sinful, and damnable.
. Only then there arises the
awareness for the need of Christ the Redeemer. Then, “if you
believe in him,” continues Luther, “you may through this faith
become a new man.”^^ In one sense this is a new status be-
fore God: “Your sins are forgiven and you are justified by
the merits of another, namely, of Christ alone.” In another
perspective faith can be understood in terms of the Law and
Gospel dialectic. Namely, the details of personal sinfulness are
recognized as God, through the Law, demands specific obedi-
ence in particulars. Here pride and false piety crumble as they
are confronted by God’s eternal commandments, which “show
us what we ought to do but do not give us the power to do it”.
Yet they are by no means useless. “They are intended to teach
man to know himself, that through them he may recognize his
inability to do good and may despair of his own ability.”’^! Of
course, despair is only the initial response to the divine demand
and hence only a stage in the process of faith. Subsequently,
in the next, the promise-stage, God gives “what the command-
ments of God demand and fulfil what the law prescribes.
This giving, as Luther describes it, is personal, intimate, and
redemptive. Here an authentic union takes place and the be-
liever is liberated from the power of sin. Luther writes: “Since
these promises of God are holy, true, righteous, free, and peace-
ful words, full of goodness, the soul which clings to them with
a firm faith will be so closely united with them and altogether
absorbed by them that it not only will share in all their power
but will be saturated and intoxicated by them.”^^ Thus what
has changed is not only a man’s status but also his personality.
Here several facets may be considered. According to Wolfhart
Pannenberg, from the mystical tradition Luther has absorbed
an experiential sense:
There is an element of “ecstasis” in the act of faith. We literally
leave ourselves to the one to whom we completely entrust ourselves.
This ecstatic nature of faith is presupposed in Luther’s recurrent
affirmations that through faith we participate in Christ and, indeed,
in God—in the divine life and spirit and grace.
The way Luther describes this experience makes clear that
it is not self-originating, but a gift from God through Jesus
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Christ: “If a touch of Christ healed, how much more will this
most tender spiritual touch, this absorbing of the Word, com-
municate to the soul all things that belong to the Word.”'^^ At
the same time, while an evoked experience and a personal act,
it does not remain an isolated moment. Here in trust, as Pan-
nenberg puts it, “the trusting person surrenders to the one in
whom such confidence is entrusted.” Of course, Luther knows
that faith has its subjective, human side: it is the believer who
believes, trusts, and loves! Yet such activity is not merely a
human “work”. That is to say, while personally real and nec-
essarily a subjective experience, faith does not remain an inde-
pendent, autonomous act. Faith is essentially the joining of the
believer to Jesus Christ. To affirm this insight, Luther makes
use of the ancient illustration for mystical union: “Just as the
heated iron glows like fire because of the union of fire with it,
so the Word imparts its qualities to the soul.”'^^ The illustra-
tion, as made use of in the Early Church, vividly accents the
effects of Christ’s divinity on the believer. The divinity/fire so
engulfs and irradiates the iron/humanity, that while the latter
can continue to be discerned abstractly, in concrete encounters
first noticed is the divinity/fire.
Wilhelm Maurer, with many others, has observed that
ordinarily Luther has emphasized the human side. That is to
say, in contrasting the theology of the cross with the theology
of glory, the way to the divinity of Christ is only through the
suffering on the cross, hence through Christ’s humanity. With-
out denying the significance of this motif, in this tract Luther
obviously makes use of several facets of the motif of deification.
Speaking of the believer in Pauline terms as “the soul”, Luther
portrays redemption as a unitive transformation, experienced
in joyous receptivity. Consequently, the “Christian. . .needs no
works to justify him.”^^ Participatory unity has reshaped the
believer’s total existence. At the same time Luther does not
disregard the significant role of the believer’s humanity. Here
we may once more return to the motif of trust, specifically the
act of trusting. Luther writes: “There is no other honor equal
to the estimate of truthfulness and righteousness with which we
honor him whom we trust. Wolfhart Pannenberg observes:
In medieval theology, faith meant assent to the doctrine of the
church, an assent, to be sure, that must be motivated by love of
God in order to have salvific effect. Luther not only added the
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notion of trust, but he wanted to emphasize that the personal cen-
ter itself changes in the act of trust, because the trusting person
surrenders to the one in whom such confidence is entrusted.®
^
In other words, the acknowledged trustworthiness of God,
in analogy to a person praised for trustworthiness, is both the
highest human expression of praise and personal reliance at the
very same time. Similarly, if we do not trust another person,
we attribute to her/him the worst of all human qualities. Thus
trust accounts most centrally for the quality of relationships
between people as well as between people and God. Luther
underscores: “So when the soul firmly trusts God’s promises,
it regards him as trustful and righteous.” ^2 This is “the very
highest worship of God.”^^ And it has a clear and concrete
route of actualization, as the trusting person obeys God: “the
soul consents to his will”.S4 And the very centre of this consent
is within faith: “This obedience.. is not rendered by works, but
by faith alone.” When misunderstood, Luther is thought to
teach an inactive inwardness, where a mere presence of faith au-
tomatically accounts for a condition (of justification) which has
not occurred in the actual existence of the believer. Luther’s
account, however, points to fact and not to pious fiction. Trust
in God consists of a faithful, actual, and active obedience. Here
in trusting God the power of faith comes to fruition. Such an
emphasis on the centrality of trust, notes Wolfhart Pannen-
berg, so “crucial in Luther’s argument”, has not always been
fully appreciated. Pannenberg continues:
Melanchthon appropriated the interpretation of faith in terms of
personal trust, and he often argued that trust is the only adequate
way of responding to a promise. But Melanchthon did not grasp
Luther’s profound insight that faith by way of ecstasis participates
in the reality of Christ himself and therefore transforms the faithful
into Christ’s image. Consequently, in Melanchthon’s theology jus-
tification remained a somewhat wooden, juridical matter, while in
Luther’s language it had a mystical fiavor.^^
Of course, there were times when Luther himself made good
use of juridical language since it is scriptural. Thus Luther
writes: “So Paul says in Romans 4[:3] that Abraham’s faith
’was reckoned to him as righteousness’ because by it he gave
glory most perfectly to God, and that for the same reason our
faith shall be reckoned to us as righteousness if we believe.”
Indeed, it was in faith that Abraham obeyed. But his obedient
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trust was not merely an attitude, but also a courageous act
which occurred and was reckoned to Abraham as righteousness.
And since it was not only a God-oriented venture, but also a
participatory experience, a unitive grasp of God’s presence at
the closest range, Luther turns further attention to this motif
of mystical unity. He writes: “The third incomparable benefit
of faith is that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united
with her bridegroom. By this mystery, as the Apostle teaches,
Christ and the soul become one flesh [Ephesians 5:31-32].” ^8
Quoting Luther’s tract on freedom at this point, Bengt R.
Hoffman adds the following overview:
From Luther’s remarks on participation in God we draw the conclu-
sion that one does not do justice to his view of sharing in divine life
by concentration on the “for you” of redemption or by a reduction
of redemption to the ethical. On Luther’s view the freedom engen-
dered by the gospel was not simply a declaration of grace, but an
experience of joy and inner change.
At the same time, two further observations are in order.
On the one hand, Luther does indeed make use of the lan-
guage of mysticism with particular attention to the analogy of
marriage which he explains as follows: “And if they are one
flesh and there is between them a true marriage—indeed the
most perfect of all marriages, since human marriages are but
poor examples of this one true marriage—it follows that every-
thing they have they hold in common, the good as weU as the
evil.” 90 On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that
Luther does not at this time go on to explore the exact nature
of this unitive experience analogous to a marriage but instead
shifts his attention to the so-called “joyous exchange”: “Ac-
cordingly the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever
Christ has as though it were its own, and whatever the soul
has Christ claims as his own.” 91 Here then the truth of the
atonement is expressed by a continuous assertion of the simul
iustus et peccator theme, retained in the midst of a unitive
experience, and described with special attention of the human
appropriation of salvation. In Luther’s words:
Christ is full of grace, life, and salvation. The soul is full of sins,
death, and damnation. Now let faith come between them and sins,
death, and damnation will be Christ’s, while grace, life, and salva-
tion will be the soul’s; for if Christ is a bridegroom, he must take
upon himself the things which are his bride’s and bestow upon her
the things that are his.92
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Here, without denying the experiential dimension of the re-
demptive event, Luther’s main attention continues to be on the
gift of faith, even when expressed in terminology which echoes
the mystical tradition: Jesus Christ, “by the wedding ring of
faith. . .shares in the sins, death, and pains of hell which are his
bride’s.” Clearly enough, an understanding of the atonement
presupposes the affirmation of incarnation. As the incarnate
Lord, Christ gains victory and thus redemption through the
route of suffering: “he suffered, died, and descended into hell
that he might overcome them all.” 94 Without at this time sub-
scribing to a detailed theory of atonement, it is already here
that the Christus Victor motif has emerged with some clarity
(“death and hell could not swallow him up, these were neces-
sarily swallowed up by him in a mighty duel. ..”).95
A further facet to be noted is that the faith Luther is speak-
ing about is above all an undeserved gift. The analogy of “mar-
riage” is therefore now upgraded to a “royal marriage”
,
and as
such here it is not a marriage between equals: “Here this rich
and divine bridegroom Christ marries this poor, wicked har-
lot, redeems her from all her evil, and adorns her with all his
goodness. Her sins cannot now destroy her, since they are
laid upon Christ and swallowed up by him.” 96 And repeatedly
Luther notes that “good works” cannot fulfil the demands of
the Law, and thereby obtain justification. The activities of the
self are after all motivated by the “heart” . Only when the self,
in its core, has been transformed and elevated to a new, au-
thentic status of redeemed existence, can there emerge works
which are acceptable to God. This insight has not only per-
sonal but also corporate ramifications for a new understanding
of ecclesiology and government. Here Luther makes use of the
concept of the priesthood of all believers. Namely, sharing
through faith in the being of Christ, all believers participate
in the priesthood and in the kingship. Luther puts it this way:
“Hence all of us who believe in Christ are priests and kings
in Christ, as I Peter 2[:9] says: ‘You are a chosen race, God’s
own people, a royal priesthood, a priestly kingdom, that you
may declare the wonderful deeds of him who called you out of
darkness into this marvelous light.’ ”97 Clearly, Christian free-
dom is then applicable both to church and state. Dietrich von
Oppen sums up with poetic clarity:
Now the ideas in The Freedom of a Christian broke down all the
retaining walls; all institutions and relationships were declared to
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be of fundamentally secondary significance; the driving force of the
gospel was brought without restriction to all men in the same way;
all spheres of life were bathed in the one, brilliant light and mea-
sured by the same ultimate norms.
Luther’s text allows for such—and even more exuberant
—
’ generalizations. Clearly, Luther’s central concern of this tract
is not political but soteriological. His more detailed exposi-
i
tions are concerned with the soteriological themes. Yet on oc-
casions Luther offers insights which could be seen as celebrat-
ing freedom without boundaries. For example, according to
Luther, the Christian “by virtue of his royal power. . .rules over
all things, death, life, and sin, and through his priestly glory is
' omnipotent with God because he does the things which God
asks and desires. . ..”^9
But then, as if having second thoughts, Luther quickly be-
gins to clarify the meaning of priesthood. First, in principle
priests do not differ from laymen; the various clerical titles,
insofar as they suggest superiority, are wrongly apphed to one
class of people. Second, realistically, there has to be a divi-
sion of labour as a matter of good order and efficiency. Luther
knows: “Although we are all equally priests, we cannot all
publicly minister and teach.” Third, in Roman CathoHcism
common sense had been changed into manipulative exercise
of power—indeed, it had “developed into so great a display
of power and so terrible a tyranny that no heathen empire or
other earthly power can be compared with it, just as if laymen
were not also Christians.”
Yet, as may be readily recognized, Luther’s critique of what
he regarded as a decadent church was not being offered in
administrative categories. Here Luther has not attempted to
draw a profile of the Lutheran pastor, and to spell out the role
of a Lutheran prince or a Lutheran city council. Luther is only
recording what it means to be a Christian. Here, appropriately,
the central significance belongs to Christ and the proclamation
of Christ. The latter Luther perceives in intensely existentialist
terms: it is necessary not only to proclaim Christ in general,
but to experience this reality in one’s own personal life—that
He “be Christ for you and me” .1^2 Finally, Luther also turns his
attention to what he has called “the outer man”. 1^3 Namely, in
seeking to live one’s faith, the believer encounters grave difficul-
ties: “he meets a contrary will in his own flesh which strives to
108 Consensus
serve the world and seeks its own advantage.” 101 Since Luther
is not a Platonic dualist, the distinction, as already noted, is
not between soul and body, but between faith and sin. And yet
Luther here does attribute a certain negative role to the phys-
ical body. It tends to be rebellious, “if not held in check”. 10^
Hence the believer needs “to discipline his body by fasting,
watchings, labors, and other reasonable discipline... ”106 And
since temptations come relentlessly, “a man cannot be idle, for
the need of his body drives him and he is compelled to do many
good works to reduce it to subjection.” 107 Still, there is no pos-
sibility to gain righteousness by such ascetic and good works.
Faith, not works, justifies; here Luther is inflexible. Subse-
quently, the believer “does the works out of spontaneous love
in obedience to God. ...”108 In this way asceticism is retained,
but removed from the context of merit and placed in the set-
ting of gratitude as well as common sense. Consequently, the
“bodily castigations” have to be adjusted to individual needs.
After all, only the individual can know what is “sufficient to
repress the lasciviousness and lust of his body”. 109 But this
is not merely subjective and exclusively personal knowledge
alone. Turning attention to the source of good works, Luther
appeals to Matthew 7:18, and notes that as a good tree bears
good fruit, so a “good man does good works” .HO Aware that he
is charged with rejecting good works,m he regards the charge
as erroneous, as it overlooks that faith does not remain idle;
it is from faith that good works flow. But this is not an au-
tomatic process. The larger context here, as already earlier in
the tract, is the dialectic between Law and Gospel. Within
the penitential self-understanding and redemptive restoration
insights abound. Intriguingly, Luther does not seek to develop
any sort of casuistry, but concludes his great treatise with at-
tention to love as the essence and source of good works. Such
love, authentic and challenging, is continuously other-directed.
The basic principle is the following: “A man does not live for
himself alone in this mortal body to work for it alone, but he
lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others
and not for himself.” H2 As the result, the outworking of Chris-
tian obedience will be oriented to the needs of the neighbour
in mind: “he should be guided in all his works by this thought
and contemplate this one thing alone, that he may serve and
benefit others in all that he does, considering nothing except
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the need and the advantage of his neighbor.” This, then,
is no wooden performance of duty: “Here faith is truly active
through love [Galatians 5:6].” Yet how one is to discern the
needs of the neighbour in a serious in-depth manner, Luther
does not state. In a way this is a serious lacuna; but the discov-
ery of lacunae at the beginning stages of one’s theology is no
rarity. At the same time, precisely this vaguely structured but
intense affirmation of love for the neighbour has also turned out
to be a creative contribution. Wolfhart Pannenberg discerns
that as follows:
The Lutheran insistence on pure doctrine was as monolithic as any-
thing at that time. There was no room for doctrinal pluralism. And
yet, it was not by chance that the principle of Christian freedom
favored in the long run a more pluralistic and tolerant attitude even
in questions of doctrine. The reason is that the principle of Chris-
tian freedom embodies the spirit of immediacy to Christ on the
part of the individual believer, and therefore it entails a necessity
for personal judgment on matters of authoritative doctrine. Such
a critical judgment of the individual conscience may not enjoy the
public authority in the church that belongs to its special ministry.
Nevertheless, the principle of Christian freedom entitles Christians
to their own personal judgment in matters of faith. This entails a
pluralistic situation within the church concerning questions of doc-
trine on the local level of the life of the church as well as on the
regional and university level.
Of course, Pannenberg was not merely guessing what
might be the future development of Luther’s theology—he al-
ready knew the results. Yet his observation is not insignifi-
cant. Luther’s unfortunate outbursts of intolerance, his anti-
Semitism, his theological self-righteousness, need to be bal-
anced not only with his authentic humility, but also with this
intense concern for loving one’s neighbour. Indeed, as Friedrich
Wilhelm Kantzenbach puts it, “Luther can masterfully derive
love from the life in faith.”
The concluding section of The Freedom of a Christian
repeatedly—and powerfully—celebrates the meaning of faith
active in love. Generally it is a christocentrically understood
love. Namely, the Christian, “free from all works. . .ought in this
liberty to empty himself, take upon himself the form of a ser-
vant, be made in the likeness of men, be found in human form,
and to serve, help, and in every way deal with his neighbor as
he sees that God through Christ has dealt and still deals with
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This must not be viewed as a mere imitation. After
all, here we are not on the level of works, making the effort to
be like Christ. Instead of an imitation, Luther prefers to speak
of an identification: “I will therefore give myself as a Christ
to my neighbor, just as Christ offered himself to me.”n8 Man-
nermaa comments: “Thus when the idea of deification and the
conception of God are mutually connected, it becomes clear,
how it is from the deepest roots of Luther’s theology that there
arises his view of the Christian as a Christ to the neighbor.”!
And when Luther subsequently celebrates the life of Chris-
tian love, he is not merely reflecting on what Christians can
do, but above all observing what they really are in the deep-
est core of their being: “Behold, from faith thus flow forth
love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful, willing, and
free mind that serves one’s neighbor willingly and takes no ac-
count of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, of gain
or loss.” 120 The exuberance is almost overwhelming, as Luther
sets forth the profile of Christian existence. Of course, the re-
ality of simul iustus et peccator is thereby not rejected. Luther
has not slipped into idealism! At the same time, Luther has
offered a precise definition of what it means to be a iustus and
to live in agape. In a subsequent passage Luther puts it this
way:
Just as our neighbor is in need and lacks that in which we abound,
so we were in need before God and lacked his mercy. Hence, as our
heavenly Father has in Christ freely come to our aid, we also ought
freely to help our neighbor through our body and its works, and
each one should become as it were a Christ to the other that we
may be Christs to one another and Christ may be the same in all,
that is, that we may be truly Christian.!^!
Roland H. Bainton saw in the assertion that “a Christian
must be a Christ to his neighbor” the very “epitome of Luther’s
ethic”. 122 Tuomo Mannermaa suggests more. Mannermaa rec-
ognizes that this quotation “expresses the essence of the con-
ception of theosis”.!23 Mannermaa observes that “the Chris-
tians were called Christians by Luther, because Christ lives in
them and they are continuously Christs to each other.” He
then points to Luther’s statement:
But alas in our day this life is unknown throughout the world; it is
neither preached about nor sought after; we are altogether ignorant
of our own name and do not know why we are Christians or bear the
Freedom 111
name of Christians. Surely we are named after Christ, not because
he is absent from us, but because he dwells in us, that is, because
we believe in him and are Christs one to another and do to our
neighbors as Christ does to us.^^'^
Luther’s examples for such a life-style are scriptural. The
New Testament’s concern with the injunctions of the Old Tes-
tament provide Luther with concrete cases where obedience
and freedom have coexisted and love has flourished. Thus Vir-
gin Mary, even when submitting to the Mosaic law of purifi-
cation [Luke 2:22], did so “out of free and willing love”. 1^5
Apostle Paul circumcised Timothy for the sake of the “weak”
,
but refused to circumcise Titus at the demand of the work-
righteous. 1^6 Both Christ’s example of willingly paying the tax
moneyl27 (Matthew 17:24-27) and Paul’s teaching in Romans
13 : 1-7128 spell out for Luther that, justified by faith, “Chris-
tians should be subject to the governing authorities”, not in
order to earn salvation, “but that in the liberty of the Spirit
they shall by so doing serve others and the authorities them-
selves and obey their will freely and out of love.” 129
Now while such instances are a very long distance from a co-
herent application of Luther’s ethical theory—and may, in fact
raise questions about the viability of his theory itself—one may
also appreciate Luther’s limited accomplishment. Luther has
portrayed Christian freedom with primary attention to the in-
ner liberation and spontaneous creativity which is the result
of redemption and faithful love. In previous writings and sub-
sequent elaboration Luther is able to develop ethics for soci-
ety. On the basis of this tract alone it is unfair to attribute
to Luther a mere subjective inwardness, obflvious to societal
problems and responsibilities. 1^0
Moreover, the struggle for reform in the Roman Catholic
Church draws Luther’s attention to some issues which today
may appear somewhat peripheral. Particularly this may be
the case in regard to Luther’s impassioned comments on the
role of ecclesial ceremonies. He sees in their rigid defense an
unbiblical practice of work-righteousness—hence his eagerness
to criticize “the unyielding, stubborn ceremonialists who like
deaf adders are not willing to hecir the truth of liberty.” 1^1 Thus
the tract ends on a quasi-Erasmian note. The eventual conflict
with Erasmus ought not to lead us to disregard his influence on
contemporaries, Luther included! Of course, Erasmus was one-
sided and failed to celebrate the positive dimensions of liturgy
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and the sacramental means of grace. But with Luther he
rightly rejected the workrighteousness element in ceremonies.
Accordingly, Erasmus scorned the shortsightedness which “em-
braced the shadows and neglected the substance”. 1^2 Luther,
at this point similarly, could write of ceremonies in analogy
to builders’ “models and plans”: “They are prepared, not as
permanent structure, but because without them nothing could
be built or made. When the structure is complete, the models
and plans are laid aside.”
In conclusion, we shall reiterate that Luther’s concern with
freedom is thoroughly soteriological. In its essence liberation
consists of redemption. That Luther as a biblical theologian
would be concerned about salvation, of course, offers no sur-
prise. Rather, the ultimate significance of the tract on Chris-
tian freedom may be seen in its contextuality balancing role.
While as a reformer Luther indeed contributed to the new un-
derstanding of the structure of the church as a realm of redemp-
tion, he, as a prophet in his time, challenged his contempo-
raries to correlate their ecclesial renewal with the foundational
Word of God. Luther saw that this endeavour presupposed per-
sonal renewal, yet in such a way that it would not remain self-
centered and personal effort-oriented, but would be grasped as
participatory and unitive. In faith and in courageous living of
faith, experiencing the presence of Christ through the Word,
Luther outlined the reciprocity of preaching and hearing, of
delivering and receiving, and of loving and being loved: this
was the context where the reality of Christ would be grasped
both personally and corporately.
Not the denial of the need of activity in religion, but the
prioritizing of responsibilities is what earmarked Luther’s ef-
forts: the authentic human being in Luther’s view emerged
only under the impact of God’s Word and in faith, enabling
the becoming of Christ for others as well as the acceptance of
the Christ in others for one’s own life. At times Luther seemed
to succeed in following his own theology. At other times the
success eluded him. In both settings Luther continued to look
for grace. Without denying that at times Luther’s steady foot
slipped badly and he turned away from Christian freedom, it
is not true that “battered in later years by onslaughts from
the right and the left, [Luther] was to settle back onto the re-
liable old forms of religious expression like a sea lion finding a
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rock in a storming ocean, where he might sit and roar back at
the tempest.” Even in old age Luther dared to go into the
storming ocean of active life, and knew that sola gratia was
the route to Christ and redemption.
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